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Imagine this scenario. Your organization operates a website. It 
provides an open forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences concern-
ing the status and role of information technology and democracy develop-
ment across local and national borders, particularly in the East Asia area. 
One day you receive a call from a lawyer who says that the lawyer’s client is 
very upset about one of the postings to your website. The lawyer claims 
that the posting is using the client's trademark, or copyrighted text, or that 
the posting libels the client, or amounts to illegal hate speech. The lawyer 
demands that you immediately take down the posting or you will be sued or 
even criminally prosecuted. 
And then comes the kicker. You ask: “Lawyer, where are you call-
ing from?—Taichung?” He answers: “Why no … “ Now here you can fill 
in some distant, foreign place: Delhi, India; Victoria, Australia; Paris, 
France; Vienna, Austria. 
A few weeks ago, the internet search engine company Yahoo got 
just such a call from the government of India. India had banned a group 
seeking a separate state for the Khasi people of the state of Meghalaya in 
northeastern India. India demanded that Yahoo block access to a separatist 
news group. Yahoo refused—this time—and India tried blocking on its 
own. Yahoo is no stranger to such requests.  
In April 2000 Yahoo at its headquarters in Santa Clara, California, 
received a letter that stated "unless you cease presenting Nazi objects for 
sale within 8 days, we shall … force your company to abide by [French] 
law." When Yahoo failed to comply, the letter writers served process on 
Yahoo in California and filed civil complaints against it in the Tribunal de 
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Grande Instance de Paris for alleged violation of a French criminal statute 
barring the public display in France of Nazi-related "uniforms, insignia or 
emblems". At first, Yahoo made changes to its French site, but refused to 
change its U.S. offerings. In the end, however, rather than attempt to filter 
its sites for users in different countries, Yahoo banned such Nazi material 
from all of its sites.  
Nor is Yahoo alone in finding itself liable abroad for third party in-
formation available through its website. From Australia in the Pacific to 
Austria in Europe content providers are encountering intercontinental li-
ability. Last December, the High Court of Australia found Dow Jones sub-
ject to suit in Victoria for alleged libel in its Barrons publication, even 
though Barrons is not available in Australia other than over the American 
website. While that case did not involve third-party content, two Decem-
bers before the Highest Court of Austria in Vienna found an Austrian web 
site provider liable for acts of unfair competition by a linked website located 
in the United States.  
As a result of suits similar to these, the United States and other 
countries have adopted laws designed to protect persons against liability for 
third party information. One American commentator predicted earlier this 
year that market forces will force countries to move toward legal systems 
that either (a) completely shield internet service providers from such liability 
or (b) enable Internet service providers to shield themselves from most li-
ability through reasonable, affordable self-policing.”1 So far that has yet to 
happen and, in any case, its utility will depend upon how broadly Internet 
service provider is defined. 
This presentation examines some of the new laws that affect the li-
ability risks faced by online service providers that rely in part or in whole on 
information posted or otherwise provided by third parties, both with re-
spect to issues associated with liability for defamatory information and to 
infringement issues. 
 
1. Introduction: Information Provider Liability Generally 
 
Long before anyone imagined the Internet, intermediaries were 
subject to liability for the information they helped convey from sources to 
end users. While we think first of authors and publishers as the parties liable 
for information content and its distribution, other parties who do not origi-
                                                 
1 Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 Boston College Law Review 
359, 384 (2003) 
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nate information but only facilitate its distribution, e.g., bookstores, news 
services, etc., are subject to liability.  
In the world of the Internet, most businesses of any size have a 
presence on the web. The Internet is quintessentially concerned with in-
formation. Most businesses must rely on others for at least some of the 
information they make available. Naturally they are concerned with the risks 
they face and would like to know whether there are steps they can take to 
reduce those risks. 
In this presentation we are going to consider first the most impor-
tant areas of liability for distribution of third party content. These laws pre-
date the Internet and continue in force. We will then consider liability for 
third party content under the most important of those laws. Finally, we will 
consider how two relatively new federal laws, section 230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act (“CDA”) and section 512 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DCMA”) change the law of liability for third party content, 
and will also examine a European counterpart. Along the way we will con-
sider the risks intermediaries run and how practically both under the old law 
and the current law they may seek to reduce them. 
Few, if any, of the specific legal issues information service provid-
ers face in providing information on the Internet are new. Most are old is-
sues that have assumed new or different importance because the Internet 
has changed the quantity, speed and geographic scope of information dis-
tribution. A few examples of how the Internet has changed things quickly 
come to mind. “Public information” that was available only when looked 
up in a courthouse is now much more public when it can be consulted 
online. Republication of articles, which was a common practice in early 19th 
century magazines, takes on a whole different scope when the number of 
articles republished goes from dozens to millions. International distribution 
which before the Internet was unusual is now the rule.   
A particularly important practical change in Internet publication is 
that frequently the information service provider is often the easiest defen-
dant to locate and the one with more resources to pay a judgment (“deep 
pocket’).  
 
2. Liability for Third Party Content as an International Issue 
 
The Internet makes liability for third party content an international 
issue. Every posting on the World Wide Web is an international one, since 
every posting is available in almost every country on earth. 
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International distribution of information is not new. Information 
has gone global for centuries. Plaintiffs have long brought claims not only 
in the country where a publication is printed, but in other countries where 
the publication is distributed and where other parties suffer injury. But until 
recently it was relatively rare for a publication to be circulated in significant 
numbers outside its home country. Now, with the advent of the Internet, it 
is not only no longer rare, it is the rule. 
Worldwide distribution poses nightmare-like risks, namely: 
 
• Jurisdiction anywhere in the world 
• Differing legal requirements in different jurisdictions 
 
The World Wide Web is less than ten years old yet, as we  have al-
ready seen, there are cases involving liability, including intermediary liability, 
for Internet distribution.  
Life would be simpler for information providers if the law of a sin-
gle nation, say the country of origin, exclusively governed their publications. 
Last year, in Australian case I mentioned, the Wall Street Journal argued that 
Internet information providers should be subject only to the law of their 
home servers. It contended that publishers can comply with the law of one 
jurisdiction, but cannot reasonably be expected to comply with the laws of 
one hundred jurisdictions. The High Court of Australia rejected the argu-
ment.  
As much as producers of goods, software and information would 
like a single country rule, particularly in the area of information such a 
regimen seems unlikely. The Law Commission of England and Wales per-
ceptively observed only a few months ago:  
 
Jurisdictions not only differ in the way that they view 
defamation: they also believe strongly in their own inter-
pretation of the right to freedom of expression. It is there-
fore an area which is particularly likely to generate culture 
clashes.2  
 
The Law Commission found the international choice of law prob-
lem “intractable.” Perhaps someday, rather than applying a country-of-
origin rule, there might be a single global rule for the Internet, but that day 
 
2 LAW COMMISSION, DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, 
SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, December 2002, 34, at ¶ 4.34. 
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seems far off. For the foreseeable future, information providers must live 
with the possibility that their publications on the Internet may subject them 
to liability in any jurisdiction where the Internet is accessible. 
 
3.  Types of Liability:  Information Acquisition and Distribution 
 
Information providers typically are information intermediaries. 
They acquire information from third parties, when they do not create it 
themselves, and then they distribute that information to others. Liability for 
the information arises principally in one of two ways: either the right to dis-
tribute the information is imperfect or the content of the information is 
harmful to others. 
 
a.  Information Acquisition 
 
When is an intermediary liable to others who have superior rights 
in the information? Principal areas of law of concern include: 
 
• Copyright 
• Trademark 
• Database Protection 
• Data Protection/Privacy 
 
Information providers have a number of ways to protect them-
selves against liability when faced with claims of inadequate rights to infor-
mation. These are both practical and contractual: 
 
• Deal with reputable sources 
• Limit the quantity of information distributed 
• Require proof of permissions to use copyrighted mate-
rial & trademarks 
• Require contractual indemnities from suppliers 
 
Where an information provider undertakes an obligation to publish 
the information of a third party, it should also take care to reserve in the 
license agreement its right to take down information that another party con-
tends is infringing or otherwise objectionable. 
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b.  Distribution of Information 
 
When is an information provider subject to liability for harm result-
ing from distribution of information? Principal areas of law of concern in-
clude: 
 
• Libel/Defamation 
• Competition Law 
• Trademark Law 
• Inaccurate Information: Tort and Contract Claims 
• Fraud 
• Criminal Liability for Obscenity/Hate Material 
• Privacy/Data Protection 
 
Of these, defamation has historically has been the principal con-
cern in using third party content for most information providers. Competi-
tion and trademark law claims have been a distant second. The other poten-
tial bases of liability have not been of as great concern in the context of 
intermediary distribution of third party information. Information providers 
generally are not subject to liability for information that is merely inaccu-
rate.3 Where fraud or potential criminal activity is at stake, the intermediary 
has not been the first target. Privacy and data protection present new issues.  
Thus this presentation focuses on defamation, competition and trademark 
claims. 
Information providers have a number of ways to protect them-
selves from liability for the content of the information they distribute:  
 
• Review the information 
• Restrict circulation of the information 
• Use contracts with recipients to limit liability  
 
As with questions of right to publish, cautious information provid-
ers that undertake commitments to publish third party information should 
be sure to reserve for themselves a right to remove from circulation publi-
cations that are challenged as objectionable. 
 
                                                 
3 See Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 404(b)(1) (no implied warranty 
with respect to “published informational content”). 
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c. Intermediary Liability: Intermediaries’ Relationship to In-
formation 
 
Liability issues for use of third party content frequently turn on the 
relationship of the intermediary information provider to the information. At 
the one extreme, the intermediary may be a “mere conduit”. It may be a 
postal or courier service delivering a circular or a phone company providing 
the telephone line for conversation. In these cases, the intermediary has no 
knowledge of the content of the information and little opportunity to affect 
its distribution. At the other extreme, the “intermediary” may itself com-
mission the creation of the work and control its content. In the former case, 
the intermediary furnishes nothing more than a technical distribution; in the 
latter, the “intermediary” information provider makes the information its 
own. In between are intrmediaries with varying degrees of knowledge of the 
information and control over it. 
 
4.  Defamation 
 
American defamation law distinguishes: 
 
• Primary publishers 
• Distributors, i.e., bookstores, libraries, news distributors 
• Mere conduits, i.e., telephone company, post office 
 
Primary publishers are subject to liability standards similar to 
those of authors. At common law, liability for defamation was liability 
without fault: it was sufficient for a plaintiff to show that defendant pub-
lished a false and defamatory statement. Today publishers are held to a fault 
based standard. When publishers rely on third party content; they are not 
liable for that content if they were justified in relying on the third party 
source. Plaintiffs must show some level of negligence. Thus primary pub-
lishers are in a position to protect themselves by reviewing the works they 
publish. 
 
Mere conduits, on the other hand, have neither knowledge of nor 
ability to control content of information. They are not generally subject to 
liability for defamation. 
 
Distributors may be subject to liability, but only if they know or 
have reason to know of the defamatory nature of the information. Unlike 
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primary publishers, distributors are not required to know the contents of 
the information they distribute. However, once they learn of the defamatory 
nature of information, they may be held liable if they continue to distribute 
it. 
 
5.  Liability for Unfair Competition and Trademark Claims 
 
Competition law holds intermediaries liable using the concept of 
contributory deceptive marketing. Persons may be held liable for deceptive 
marketing by third parties where they “directly and substantially” assist the 
party making the representation. Thus printers, publishers, and suppliers 
can be liable for the deceptive content of the information of others. How-
ever, their liability for third party content is limited to appropriate injunctive 
relief unless they knew that the information was likely to deceive or rea-
sonably ought to have known that. 
Distributors are liable as principals if they command the conduct or 
if they “fail[] to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the 
third person’s conduct in circumstances in which that conduct can be rea-
sonably anticipated.”4
Intermediary liability for trademark infringement is similar to that 
for deceptive marketing. It is based on the concept of contributory in-
fringement. Persons may be held liable for trademark infringement where 
they make improper use of trademarks on behalf of others. Thus printers, 
publishers, and suppliers can be liable for trademark infringement by oth-
ers. However, their liability for third party content is limited to “appropriate 
                                                 
4 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, UNFAIR COMPETITION 
 (1995) §§ 7 – 8: 
 
§ 7 Contributory Liability of Printers, Publishers, and Other Suppliers
(1) One who, by supplying materials or rendering services to a third person, directly and sub-
stantially assists the third person in making a representation that subjects the third person to liability to 
another for deceptive marketing under the rules stated in §§ 2-6 is subject to liability to that other for 
contributory deceptive marketing. 
(2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule stated in Subsection (1) acted 
without knowledge that the actor was assisting the third person in making a representation likely to 
deceive or mislead, the actor is subject only to appropriate injunctive relief. 
 
§ 8 Contributory Liability of Manufacturers and Distributors
One who markets goods or services to a third person who further markets the goods or services in a 
manner that subjects the third person to liability to another for deceptive marketing under the rules 
stated in §§ 2-6 is subject to liability to that other for contributory deceptive marketing if: 
(a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to engage in such conduct; or  
(b) the actor fails to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the third person’s 
conduct in circumstances in which that conduct can be reasonably anticipated. 
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injunctive relief” unless they knew or ought to have known that the im-
proper trademark use was intended to deceive. 
Distributors are liable as principals if they command the conduct or 
if they “fail[] to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the 
third person’s infringing conduct in circumstances in which the infringing 
conduct can be reasonably anticipated.”5
 
 
6. Liability for Copyright Infringement 
 
Intermediaries are held to higher standards under the American 
Copyright Act than they are under the other laws just discussed. They are 
subject to strict liability, vicarious liability and contributory infringement 
liability.6  
 
a.  Strict Liability
Innocent infringement is not a defense to charges of infringement. 
It is only a ground to reduce the damages awarded.7 Thus, in a famous case, 
                                                 
5 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THIRD, UNFAIR COMPETITION 
 (1995) §§ 26 – 27: 
 
§ 26 Contributory Infringement by Printers, Publishers, and Other Suppliers  
(1) One who, on behalf of a third person, reproduces or imitates the trademark, trade name, collective 
mark, or certification mark of another on goods, labels, packaging, advertisements, or other materials 
that are used by the third person in a manner that subjects the third person to liability to the other for 
infringement under the rule stated in § 20 is subject to liability to that other for contributory infringe-
ment. 
 (2) If an actor subject to contributory liability under the rule stated in Subsection (1) acted without 
knowledge that the reproduction or imitation was intended by the third person to confuse or deceive, 
the actor is subject only to appropriate injunctive relief. 
 
§ 27 Contributory Infringement by Manufacturers and Distributors  
One who markets goods or services to a third person who further markets the goods or services in a 
manner that subjects the third person to liability to another for infringement under the rule stated in § 
20 is subject to liability to that other for contributory infringement if: 
(a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to engage in the infringing conduct; or  
(b) the actor fails to take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the third person’s infringing 
conduct in circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated. 
6 For a current review of third party liability for copyright infringement, see M. Jackson, One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Historical Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 367 (2002). 
7 [Where] the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may 
reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The court shall remit 
statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for 
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Cosmopolitan magazine was held liable for copyright infringement when it 
published excerpts of a book without knowing that the excerpts included a 
passage plagiarized from a copyrighted work.8  
 
b.  Vicarious Liability 
 
The Copyright Act does not expressly address the issue of liability 
for the acts of others, but courts have held parties vicariously liable who 
knew of the infringement and who profited from it. Famous examples are 
so-called “dancehall” cases where dancehalls hire bands as independent 
contractors that perform copyrighted songs without permission. On the 
other hand, “landlords” of such premises historically have not been liable 
for infringement brought about by their tenants. In one recent case, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit relazed the element of control required and held the 
operator of a flea market vicariously liable for infringement by a tenant who 
sold bootleg records. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 
259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 
c.  Contributory Infringement 
 
Likewise the Copyright Act does not prescribe liability for con-
tributory infringement, but courts have imposed it in some cases. Liability 
requires that the defendant have had knowledge of the infringement and 
induce or contribute to the infringing activity. See Gershwin Publishing 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
 
7. Liability for other Grounds: The Provider’s Lot Before 1995 
 
In the early 1990s on the eve of the commercialization of the 
Internet, American information providers could use third party content 
with reasonable confidence that for most purposes, so long as they exer-
cised due care in selecting it and had no reason to believe that the material 
involved was deficient, they could distribute it subject only to an appropri-
ate injunction if their judgment should prove wrong. While copyright did 
not provide quite the same level of legal comfort, it offered practical com-
                                                                                                             
believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the 
infringer was [acting for various non-profit educational entities]. Copyright Act § 504(c)(2). 
8 De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir. 1944) [with a famous dissent by Learned 
Hand]. 
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fort through care in dealing with one’s sources and through the real-world 
realization that suits for de minimis infringements were unusual.  
 
8. American Protections for Third Party Providers 
 
a. CDA Section 230 
 
i.  Origin of Section 230 
 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) gives 
“interactive computer service” providers immunity for certain of their acts 
in furnishing information. Subsection (c) provides: “No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker 
of any information provided by another information content provider.”  
Section 230 was a swift Congressional response to the decision of a 
New York trial court in the case of Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services 
Co., No. 310063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In Stratton Oakmont a third party had posted defama-
tory statements about the plaintiff to a Prodigy computer bulletin board. 
The Court found that Prodigy exercised sufficient editorial control over its 
computer bulletin boards to render it a publisher with the same responsi-
bilities as a newspaper, namely liability without fault. It found that Prodigy, 
because of the extent of its control, was not subject to the standard appli-
cable to distributors such as bookstores and libraries, that are liable for de-
famatory statements of others only if they knew or had reason to know of 
the defamatory statements. The court underscored, however, that its deci-
sion was specific to the facts of Prodigy’s own bulletin board: “Let it be 
clear …”, it said, “[c]omputer bulletin boards should generally be regarded 
in the same context as bookstores, libraries and network affiliates.”  
Notwithstanding the court’s reminder that Prodigy had chosen to 
exercise greater editorial control, the court’s decision was widely seen as 
encouraging Internet service providers not to monitor the contents of bul-
letin boards, since by so doing, they might become subject to the strict li-
ability standard applied to publishers rather than the knowledge standard 
applicable to distributors. Such a development was contrary to the purpose 
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which was then under con-
sideration in Congress, and which sought to limit circulation to minors of 
indecent material. Congress reacted to the Stratton-Oakmont decision by add-
ing section 230 to the CDA. When the Supreme Court overturned the 
Communications Decency Act as unconstitutionally vague in Reno v. 
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American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997), it did not invali-
date section 230. 
 
ii.  Structure of Section 230 
 
Section 230 is titled: “Protection for private blocking and screening 
of offensive material.” It consists of six subsections. Subsection (a) contains 
findings by Congress concerning the value of the Internet and of the Inter-
net’s promotion of a “true diversity of political discourse.” Subsection (b) 
sets out the policy of the United States to promote the development of the 
Internet and user control of content. Subsection (f) gives definitions of 
some of the terms used in the law. Subsections (c), (d) and (e) contain the 
substantive provisions of the law. 
Subsection (c), which contains the immunity provisions, is titled: 
“Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive ma-
terial.” Paragraph 230(c)(1) is the provision that has been most relied on to 
protect information providers. It states: “Treatment of publisher or speaker. 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider.” Paragraph 230(c)(2), headed “civil liability”, states 
that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of action taken to restrict access to or availability of mate-
rial that the provider or user considers to be obscene ….” 
Subsection (d) requires interactive computer service providers to 
furnish new subscribers with information about the commercial availability 
of parental control protections. 
Subsection (e) states that the section 230 shall have no effect on 
criminal laws, intellectual property laws, and communications privacy law, 
or on “any State law that is consistent with this section.” On the other 
hand, subsection (d) provides that “No cause of action may be brought and 
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent 
with this section.” 
 
iii.  Interpretation of Section 230 
 
Congress adopted section 230 as a response to the decision in Strat-
ton Oakmont. Courts might readily have limited application of section 
230(c)(1) to the specific issue in Stratton-Oakmont, namely, that an Internet 
service provider that provides a bulletin board available for third party post-
ings should not be treated as a publisher under libel law. Such a provider 
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might still be liable as a distributor if, for example, it knowingly published a 
defamatory statement. Such an interpretation would have been consistent 
with the language and purpose of the statute, namely, to facilitate a obscen-
ity control by service providers of the content of bulletin boards without 
exposing them to publisher liability.  
Instead, however, in most cases decided to date, both federal and 
state courts have given section 230 an expansive application. In particular: 
 
• They have generously defined “interactive computer service” to in-
clude not only Internet service providers who furnish access to the 
Internet, but to other providers of means of access to the Internet 
and to Internet websites generally. 
 
• They have extended 230(c)(1) immunity to a range of causes of ac-
tion beyond defamation, including competition law claims. 
 
• They have extended 230(c)(1) immunity to defendants who have 
not only passed on third party content to others, but have them-
selves acquired rights in it and have even commissioned the con-
tent. 
 
• In the area of contributory trademark infringement, however, 
courts have refused to grant section 230(c) immunity. They have 
held that trademark claims are outside the grant of immunity as in-
tellectual property law claims under section 230(e)(2).  
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America 
Online, Inc., 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) started interpretation of section 
230 off on a broad course. There the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that section 230(c)(1) was designed merely to preclude liability for interac-
tive computer service providers as “publishers” and did not affect their li-
ability for defamation as “distributors”. The plaintiff contended, that since 
he had informed America Online of the libel and AOL had failed to act, it 
should be liable as a distributor. The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument 
and held that “distributor” liability is a mere subset of “publisher” liability 
under section 230(c)(1) and therefore likewise subject to the act’s immunity. 
According to the court, once a distributor receives notice of a possibly de-
famatory posting, it is thrown into the role of a traditional publisher. 
 
α.  Interactive Computer Service
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i.  Immunity for parties that provided computers to ac-
cess Internet: 
 
• Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 
(2001) (public library) 
• PatentWizard Inc. v. Kinko’s, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069 
(D.S.D. 2001) (copy shop) 
 
ii.  Immunity for sites available on Internet not offering 
access services 
 
• Schneider v. Amazon Inc, 108 Wn. App. 454 (2001) (posting 
to book review bulletin board maintained by online book-
seller) 
• Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315 (D. Conn. 2000) (in-
dividual’s chatroom) 
• In a pair of California cases, the online auction firm eBay 
was simply assumed to be an interactive computer service. 
See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002); Stoner v. 
eBay, Inc., 2000 Extra LEXIS 156, 56 U.S. P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1852 (2000). 
 
β.  Third Party Content 
 
Immunity granted notwithstanding claims that interactive computer 
service had made the publication its own: 
 
• Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (de-
fendant AOL paid author $36,000 pursuant to a license 
agreement that retained right to require reasonable changes 
to content, and “affirmatively promoted” the information)  
• Schneider v. Amazon Inc, 108 Wn. App. 454 (2001) (defen-
dant Amazon retained the right to edit content of book re-
views posted to site and received a license to redistribute 
the review worldwide) 
 
γ.  Causes of Action 
 
i.  Immunity from State Competition Law Claims
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Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002) (state com-
petition law required auctioneers to provide certificate of 
authenticity) 
Stoner v. eBay, Inc., 2000 Extra LEXIS 156, 56 U.S. P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1852 (2000) (state unfair business practices laws) 
Schneider v. Amazon Inc, 108 Wn. App. 454 (2001) (interfer-
ence with business expectancy) 
 
ii.  Immunity from Negligence Claims 
 
Green v. America Online (AOL), 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 750 
(3rd Cir. 2003) (negligent transmission of a “punter” signal 
designed to halt and disrupt recipient computer) 
Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 
2001) (negligent distribution of child pornography) 
Schneider v. Amazon Inc, 108 Wn. App. 454 (2001) (negligent 
misrepresentation) 
Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002) (negligent 
misrepresentation of safety of items offered for sale) 
 
iii.  No Immunity from Trademark Claims 
 
Under subsection 230(e)(2) “Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” Sec-
tion 230 does not state whether the Trademark Law is an intellectual prop-
erty law. For some laws, the Trademark Law, which is based on the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution and not on the Patent and Copyright 
Clause, which serves distinct and different purposes, is not classified as an 
intellectual property law. Two cases have denied section 230 immunity in 
trademark claims: 
 
Gucci America Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com Inc., No. 00-CV-71544-
DT (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2001). 
 
iv.  Assessments of Section 230 Immunity 
 
“[C]ourts have interpreted the CDA’s provisions broadly, limiting 
ISP liability in circumstances far removed from its roots in defamation. … 
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In sum, federal and state courts alike have applied 230 liberally and without 
qualification. CDA jurisprudence is, if nothing else, predictable.”9  
“[E]ssentially … an absolute immunity for ISPs in third-party 
Internet defamation suits …. [I]t has left no incentive for ISPs to monitor 
or edit their content ….”10  
The Law Commission of England and Wales observed of the Zeran 
decision applying section 230: 
It gives very little weight to the protection of reputation. Zerran suf-
fered real harm. The implication is that even if the ISP had ignored his re-
quests completely, they would have incurred no legal liability towards him.11
 
B.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)  
 
i.  Origin of Section 512 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 was an omnibus law 
that made substantial changes in many parts of American copyright law 
including, for example, to implement new World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization treaties. Title II, 17 U.S.C. § 512, provides “safe harbors” for 
service providers when faced with claims of copyright infringement. 
 
ii.  The Structure of Section 512 
 
As much as CDA section 512 is simple and expansive, section 512 
is complex and narrowing. The drafting technique of section 512 is to iden-
tify very specific situations in which service providers that comply with cer-
tain conditions, shall be relieved of some, but not all, liability. Thus where 
CDA provides immunity, section 512 provides only limitations of liability. 
Subsections (a) to (e) of section 512 set out five specific safe har-
bors for different Internet-related activities. Subsections (f) through (k) 
provide general rules that implement the safe harbors: subsection (f) sanc-
tions persons who misrepresent in implementing the safe harbors that ma-
terial is infringing; subsection (g) governs liability for removing infringing 
material; subsection (h) authorizes issuing subpoenas to identify infringers; 
                                                 
9 J. Band & M. Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communications 
Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 295, 
296, 300 (2002). 
10 S. Patel, Note: Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defama-
tion Claims: How Far Should Courts Co?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 678 (2002). 
11 LAW COMMISSION, DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, 
SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, December 2002, 17, at ¶ 2.54. 
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subsection (i) implements the conditions for eligibility for the safe harbors; 
subsection (j) provides rules for injunctions under the safe harbors; and 
subjection (k) furnishes definitions.  
The safe harbors protect four types of activity: (a) conduit; (b) 
caching; (c) posting; and (d) linking; and one type of service provider, (e) 
non-profit educational institutions. In this discussion, we will limit our con-
sideration to the (c) posting and (d) linking safe harbors as those activities 
are most relevant to operating sites featuring third party content.12
The posting and linking safe harbors are fairly similar. In both 
cases, a qualified person meeting the definition of service provider is re-
lieved of monetary damages for copyright infringement if the person does 
not know or have reason to know that material is infringing, does not re-
ceive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringement, and upon 
notice of infringement responds “expeditiously” to remove the material. In 
order to receive this limitation of liability for hosting, but not for linking, 
the person must register with the Copyright Office. To qualify for either 
limitation of liability providers must meet certain conditions of eligibility. 
 
α. Definition of Service Provider 
 
To qualify as a service provider must be “a provider of online ser-
vices or network access, or the operator of facilities ….” 17 U.S.C. § 
512(k)(1)(B). This definition includes not only Internet access, but also e-
mail, chat room and web page hosting services. 
 
β. The Posting Safe Harbor 
 
Subsection (c) is titled “Information residing on systems or net-
works at direction of users.” Its paragraph (1) provides that: “A service 
provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in 
subjection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of 
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
                                                 
12 The conduit safe harbor is available only to a narrowly defined group of service providers 
that corresponds largely to Internet access providers and does not relate to “featuring third 
party content. See 17 U.S.C. 512(k)(1)(A) (“As used in subsection (a), the term "service pro-
vider" means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for 
digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of 
the user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”) 
Caching is available to the same group of service providers as for posting and linking, but is 
less relevant to featuring third party content. Finally, the higher education safe harbor in (e) 
is sui generis and not of general relevance. 
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resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider ….” It then continues to require that the service provider meet 
four conditions: 
A. the service provider has no actual knowledge and no reason to 
know of the infringement and if it obtains knowledge of infringement acts 
expeditiously to remove infringing material; 
B. “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and 
ability to control such activity;”  
C. upon notification of a claimed infringement responds expedi-
tiously to remove the allegedly infringing material; and  
D. the service provider has registered with the Copyright Office a 
designated agent to receive such notices as in C. 
 
γ.   The Linking Safe Harbor 
 
Subsection (d) is titled “Information location tools.” It parallels the 
posting safe harbor of (c) with respect to “the provider referring or linking 
users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activ-
ity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, refer-
ence, pointer, or hypertext link ….” As with the posting safe harbor, the 
service provider must not know of the infringement, must not receive a 
financial benefit from it, and must act expeditiously against it when notified 
of it. Unlike the posting safe harbor, the linking safe harbor does not re-
quire registration with the Copyright Office. 
 
δ. Conditions for Eligibility 
 
Both the linking safe harbor and the posting safe harbor, however, 
are subject to further conditions. Subsection 512(i)(1) requires as conditions 
of eligibility that the service provider: 
“(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented and informs sub-
scribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, 
a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network 
who are repeat infringers; and 
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical 
measures [to identify or protect copyrighted works].” 
 
iii.  Interpretation of Section 512 
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α.  Contributory Infringement 
 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) 
ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communications, Inc. 239 F.3d 619 
(4th Cir. 2001) 
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) 
 
β.  Vicarious Infringement  
 
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) 
CoStar Group v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 
2001) 
 
iv. Assessments of Section 512 
 
Court interpretation of section 512 has been criticized as “parsi-
monious” especially when compared to a “generous” reading of CDA sec-
tion 310.13 Courts are seen as having had “a difficult time determining ex-
actly what is required of service providers … [and are] erring on the side of 
granting too much copyright protection.”14 Yet section 512 itself prescribes 
a very difficult route to liability limitation that only a few will be able to 
travel. 
Two American critics pointedly contrast the breadth of CDA im-
munity and the narrow scope of DMCA liability limitations. They attribute 
the difference largely to politics. “It is not surprising that Congress drafted 
the CDA’s safe harbors more broadly than the DMCA’s. After all, the con-
tent community was far better organized than likely vitims of defamation, 
and thus it was far better situated to lobby against broad safe harbors for 
ISPs.” 15
 
                                                 
13 J. Band & M. Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane: The Communica-
tions Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. 
J. 295, 320 (2002). 
14 R. Gutierrez, Save the Slip for the Service Providers: Courts Should Not Give Short Shrift 
to the Safe Harbors of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F.L. REV. 907 (2002). 
15 J. Band & M. Schruers, supra, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. at 320. 
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9.   A Look Abroad: The EU’s E-Commerce Directive 
 
As we have noted, the issue of intermediary liability for third party 
content is an international one. A detailed examination of foreign ap-
proaches is beyond the scope of this presentation. Here we look briefly only 
at one principal foreign attempt to address the problem: the European Un-
ion’s “Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on elec-
tronic commerce)” [hereafter. “E-Commerce Directive” or simply, “Direc-
tive”].16  
As is the case with EU directives generally, the E-Commerce Di-
rective is a direction to Member States of the European Union to adjust 
their laws to conform to the Directive. It is not itself directly applicable law. 
With respect to the topics discussed in this presentation the E-
Commerce Directive has two principal measures: 
 
• A country-of-origin rule; and 
• Limitations of liability certain kinds of activities. 
 
Article 3 adopts a country-of-origin rule designed to permit a ser-
vice provider to orient itself on the laws of the EU jurisdiction in which it is 
located and to relieve it of an obligation to observe the laws of all Member 
States.17 At this point, however, it is more aspiration than reality. It is sub-
ject to many exceptions, e.g., copyright and consumer protection laws.  
Like the analogous provision in the DCMA, the EU E-Commerce 
Directive provides a limitation of liability and not immunity as such. Like 
the DCMA it permits injunctions even while shielding providers from dam-
age claims. Unlike the DCMA provision, which is limited to liability under 
copyright law, the E-Commerce Directive applies to laws generally. With 
the exception of linking, which the Directive deliberately leaves open, the 
Directive applies only to certain specific kinds of activity, namely:  
 
• “mere conduit” (Article 12); 
• “caching” (Article 13); and,  
                                                 
16 OC L 178, 17 July 2000. 
17 See generally Gerald Spindler, Das Gesetz zum elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr – Verantworlichkeit 
der Dienstanbieter und Herkunftslandprinzip, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2002, 
921. 
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• “hosting” (Article 14). 
 
In the context of today’s discussion, limitations of liability for act-
ing as a “mere conduit” and for “caching” are of limited relevance. Hosting, 
on the other hand, offers more possible benefits. What constitutes “host-
ing,” however, remains undefined. It may include conducting a web-based 
e-mail service, newsgroups, or home pages, but probably does not include 
information aggregating.18 Standing in the way of an expansive interpreta-
tion of hosting is language in the preamble of the Directive that states that 
all of the exemptions from liability are “of a mere technical, automatic and 
passive nature” where the service provider “has neither knowledge of nor 
control over the information which is transmitted or stored.”19  
The “hosting” limitation of liability is already narrower than some 
pre-Directive limitations. Instead of it protecting the service provider with 
respect to third-party content, the Directive applies only to information 
“stored at the request of a recipient of the service.” Limitation of liability 
for hosting is subject to the condition that (a) the provider not have actual 
knowledge or reason to know of the illegal activity or (b) upon obtaining 
knowledge act “expeditiously” to remove access to the information. Article 
15, however, states that Member States shall not condition these limitations 
of liability on a general obligation to monitor. 
 
10.  Conclusion 
 
While both the United States and the European Union have taken 
steps to improve protections for service providers who utilize third party 
content, these protections are still being tested and are of uncertain benefit 
and some impose burdensome qualifying conditions. For the near future 
service provides should carefully assess their risks under existing defama-
tion, competition, trademark and copyright law and takes such steps as they 
are able—both practical and legal—to minimize those risks. While they can 
                                                 
18LAW COMMISSION, DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, 
SCOPING STUDY NO. 2, December 2002, 10, at ¶ 2.24. (calling the Directive “far from com-
prehensive” and noting that it does not apply even to aggregating information. It observed 
that the Directive does not even protect hyper-linking which, may the Commission noted, be 
subject to liability under English common law. The Commission referenced a 19th century 
case, Hird v. Wood, 38 S.J. 234 *1894, in which a defamatory placard was alongside a road. 
There was no evidence of who had placed the placard. Defendant, however, sat by it all day, 
smoking his pipe, and pointing it out to passers-by. The Court of Appeal found a publication 
and liability.) 
19 Id. at 6 (Preamble ¶ 42). 
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hardly learn the laws of all the nations of the world, if they have reason to 
believe that their information is likely to resonate in a foreign country, they 
would do well to consider the risks under the laws of that country.   
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APPENDIX—Section 230 of the CDA 
 
§ 230.  Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive 
material  
 
(a) Findings. The Congress finds the following: 
 
 (1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordi-
nary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources 
to our citizens.  
 
 (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the in-
formation that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control 
in the future as technology develops. 
 
 (3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.  
 
 (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation. 
 
 (5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a 
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
 
(b) Policy. It is the policy of the United States— 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that pres-
ently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfet-
tered by Federal or State regulation; 
 
 (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize 
user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;  
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 (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their 
children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to de-
ter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means 
of computer.  
   
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of of-
fensive material.  
 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.  
 
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account of— 
       (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict ac-
cess to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or  
        (B) any action taken to enable or make available to infor-
mation content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
material described in paragraph (1) [subparagraph (A)].  
   
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service. A provider of interactive 
computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a cus-
tomer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner 
deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering ser-
vices) are commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting 
access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or 
provide the customer with access to information identifying, current pro-
viders of such protections.  
   
(e) Effect on other laws. 
 
(1) No effect on criminal law. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this Act [47 
USCS § 223 or 231], chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
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sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, United States Code [18 USCS §§ 
1460 et seq. or §§ 2251 et seq.], or any other Federal criminal statute.  
 
(2) No effect on intellectual property law. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual prop-
erty. 
 
(3) State law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent 
any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under 
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section. 
 
 
(4) No effect on communications privacy law. Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, 
or any similar State law.  
   
(f) Definitions. As used in this section: 
 
 (1) Internet. The term "Internet" means the international com-
puter network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet 
switched data networks. 
 
  (2) Interactive computer service. The term "interactive computer 
service" means any information service, system, or access software provider 
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or edu-
cational institutions.  
 
    (3) Information content provider. The term "information content 
provider" means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service.  
 
 (4) Access software provider. The term "access software provider" 
means a provider of software (including client or server software), or ena-
bling tools that do any one or more of the following: 
  (A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
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  (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
  (C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, sub-
set, organize, reorganize, or translate content. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
